Centre-right politics

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Centre-right politics lean to the right of the political spectrum, but are closer to the centre. Parties of the centre-right generally support liberal democracy, capitalism, the market economy, private property rights, and a modest welfare state. They support conservatism and economic liberalism and oppose socialism and communism.[1]

From the 1780s to the 1880s, there was a shift in the Western world of social class structure and the economy, moving away from the nobility and mercantilism, towards capitalism.[2][3][4] This general economic shift toward capitalism affected centre-right movements, such as the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom, and the Republican Party of the United States, which responded by becoming supportive of capitalism.[5]

The International Democracy Union is an alliance of centre-right (as well as some further right-wing) political parties – including the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party of Canada, the Republican Party of the United States, the Liberal Party of Australia, the New Zealand National Party and Christian democratic parties – which declares commitment to human rights as well as economic development.[6]

Ideologies characterised as centre-right include liberal conservatism and some variants of liberalism and Christian democracy, among others. The economic aspects of the modern centre-right have been influenced by economic liberalism, generally supporting free markets, limited government spending and other policies heavily associated with neoliberalism and Third Way. The moderate right is neither universally socially conservative nor culturally liberal, and often combines both beliefs with support for civil liberties and elements of traditionalism.

Historical examples of centre-right schools of thought include One Nation Conservatism in the United Kingdom, Red Tories in Canada, and Rockefeller Republicans in the United States. New Democrats in the United States also embraced several aspects of centre-right policy, including balanced budgets, free trade, deregulation, and welfare reform. These ideological factions contrast with far-right policies and right-wing populism. They also tend to be more supportive of cultural liberalism and green conservatism than right-wing variants.

According to a 2019 study, centre-right parties had approximately 27% of the vote share in 21 Western democracies in 2018. This was a decline from 37% in 1960.[7]

Ideologies[edit]

The centre-right is heterogeneous and encompasses multiple distinct ideologies.[8][9] These commonly include conservatism[10][11][9] and Christian democracy.[10][11][12] Liberalism is sometimes grouped with the centre-right when it is expressed as conservative liberalism.[13] This is typically associated with the centre-right ideology in Europe,[14] which is contrasted with Canada and the United Kingdom where liberals often support centrist policies,[15] and with the United States where liberals more commonly support centre-left liberalism.[14] Economic ideologies associated with the centre-right include neoliberalism[16][17] and market liberalism.[12][18] Other ideologies sometimes grouped under the centre-right descriptor include agrarianism[19] and populist nationalism.[20]

Conservatism is an element of both centre-right and far-right politics, and adherents of the far-right may argue that the centre-right is insufficiently conservative.[21] Conservative centre-right parties are more likely to incorporate ethnic nationalism relative to liberal centre-right parties.[22] Conservatives and liberals both oppose heavy governmental involvement in the economy,[23] and the centre-right can also include a liberal variant of conservatism.[12][24]

Christian democracy applies Christian morality to political issues, giving a religious justification for supporting democratisation, individual liberties, and international cooperation.[25] Christian democrats hold conservative positions on most issues, but in a more moderate fashion than groups specifically described as conservative, and they trend centrist on economic issues.[26] Instead of a strong government, it advocates decentralisation where other social units such as family, the community, and various organisations are major actors in society.[27] While still supporting a market economy, Christian democracts are more open to state intervention than conservatives, so as to prevent social inequality.[28] Unlike historical Christian political movements, Christian democracy is non-denominational and is not affiliated with the Catholic Church.[25] Political scientists disagree as to whether post-war Christian democracy is continuous with that of the 19th century,[29] and Christian democracy is sometimes regarded separately from the typical right-wing voter bloc.[30]

Centre-right parties and coalitions are traditionally understood to be divided into separate factions depending on their priorities: economic, social, and cultural.[31] They are unified by their opposition to left-wing politics.[32] Christian democratic parties are affiliated with the Centrist Democrat International, and Centre-right liberal parties are affiliated with the International Democracy Union.[33] In Europe, centre-right parties are affiliated with the European People's Party.[22][34]

Centre-right liberal and conservative parties have historically been successful in the Anglosphere, such as those in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and they have made up the primary centre-right ideologies in Scandinavia.[29] In contemporary politics, these two ideologies often co-exist in the same party.[35] Christian democracy has been the predominant centre-right ideology in continental Europe, particularly in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. It has performed most successfully in Catholic countries, while Christian democracy in other countries takes on more left-wing positions or fails to gain influence.[29]

Positions[edit]

Governance[edit]

Centre-right politics is associated with conservative positions on social and cultural issues and free-market liberal positions on economic issues—centre-right parties see their strongest support among demographics that share all of these positions.[36] It broadly supports small government, though different factions hold different beliefs about when the state should intervene in economic and social affairs.[37] Conservatives generally have limited trust in human nature and believe society forms a natural hierarchical structure. Liberalism is individualist and maintains that people are best fit to make decisions for themselves.[13] Christian democrats lean toward personalism, which places value on individuals but adopts collectivist and corporatist elements as well as hierarchy.[29]

The centre-right generally seeks to preserve the societal status quo, in both a cultural and socioeconomic context,[38] and it is opposed to the radical politics espoused by the far-right.[39] Instead, it displays loss-averse tendencies and leans toward gradualism.[40] Constitutionalism and separation of powers are championed by the centre-right, combining protections for individual liberties with rule of law.[41] The centre-right's handling of the economy, its incrementalist approach to politics, and its support for the status quo have been attributed to its ability to remain in power for extended periods of time.[42]

Economics[edit]

The centre-right commonly supports a social market economy, rejecting both socialism and laissez-faire capitalism.[40] First developed by Christian democrats in post-war Germany, this system allows the state to intervene in the economy to regulate how business may be conducted, but it opposes nationalisation or infringement on the free market.[43] Social market economies allow cooperation between employers and unions, and they provide for basic welfare programs,[43] though centre-right parties that have less appeal among working class voters have less incentive to dedicate themselves to these positions.[44][45] Centre-right conservatives oppose redistributive policies, believing that individuals should be allowed to retain their wealth. This tends to attract the more wealthy to the ideology.[46] While left-wing politics involves class conflict, centre-right parties forgo this in favour of supporting overall economic growth across classes.[47]

Alongside its support for lowering spending, the centre-right supports lower taxes.[48][38] In some cases, they may advocate private-public partnership or emphasise policies geared toward economic growth—these traits are common in Latin America where centre-right parties differentiate themselves from far-right parties by appealing to the middle and working classes.[49] In most countries, centre-right ideologies such as conservatism and Christian democracy are perceived by the public as most capable of managing the economy.[50][47] Economic downturn often leads to a short-term benefit for centre-right parties before a longer-term benefit for centre-left parties.[51]

Social and cultural issues[edit]

The centre-right places emphasis on protecting public safety,[49] preserving national security, and maintaining law and order.[48][38][9] It supports democratisation around the world, and some centre-right groups consider regime change an appropriate means to spread and protect democracy.[52] Taking a strong pro-peace stance can alienate members of a centre-right voting bloc. It is often more reluctant to support peace agreements because these often involve compromising on other centre-right positions such as maintaining a strong ethnic and religious identity.[53] The centre-right leans toward paternalism over individualism and social harmony over societal conflict.[40] It is also associated with anti-communism, which earned it support during the Cold War.[54][55]

Culturally, the centre-right has prioritised national and religious identity, especially by the mid-20th century.[56] It has used religion and moral values as uniting elements, particularly with the middle class.[47] European centre-right parties place higher priority on Christianity and providing support to Christians—a trait often shared with their far-right counterparts.[57] The centre-right more strongly supports freedom of religion overall, as opposed to generalised support of human rights expressed by left-wing ideologies.[58] As European the centre-right secularises, it becomes less likely to support conservative positions on social issues.[59] Centre-right parties that take strong stances on cultural issues are more susceptible to radicalise and adopt far-right positions.[56]

While opposition to immigration is most commonly associated with far-right politics, the centre-right can attract support from voters with more moderate anti-immigrant positions.[48] Centre-right opposition to immigration comes from the challenge that immigration presents to the status quo and to national identity.[9] Supporters of centre-right politics in Europe often fear that immigration will lead to consequences such as increased crime, abuse of welfare, or acts of terrorism. Centre-right political parties sometimes take stronger positions against multiculturalism to gain an advantage over far-right parties.[38] The centre-right is more likely to present immigration as a prominent issue when it is placed in the context of economic and cultural policy.[48]

Right-wing politics has historically opposed social acceptance of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, but the European centre-right has come to support protections on the basis of sexual orientation.[60] Some centre-right groups have taken the position that gay marriage and adoption by gay couples are an extension of the traditional nuclear family.[61] Such support has not been widely extended to transgender people.[62]

History[edit]

Early history[edit]

The concept of centre-right politics is derived from the left-right political spectrum, which originated with the seating arrangements of the National Assembly during the French Revolution.[63] The centre-right came into being in the 19th century, developing with the earliest political parties.[9] Modern conservatism was derived from the ideas of British philosopher Edmund Burke and various 17th century figures who preceded him.[13] The liberal movement was heavily influenced by English philosopher John Locke, including his support for property rights and the right to overthrow tyrannical government.[13]

Early conservative and liberal parties clashed with one another: conservatives supported monarchy, land-owners, and the church, while liberals supported anti-clericalism, free markets, individualism, and scientific advancement.[13] Due to limitations in suffrage, early centre-right parties were able to maintain sufficient support by appealing solely to the upper class.[56] Christian democracy developed as a new European ideology in the 1870s as a response to the anti-clericalism advocated by liberals. Closely aligned with Catholicism, its ideals were reflected in the Rerum novarum issued by Pope Leo XIII.[13]

The European centre-right was a force of moderation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Conservatism stood between socialism and the strongly anti-socialist church by advocating a more tempered approach.[64] Christian democracy likewise presented itself as an alternative to liberalism and socialism.[13] Centre-right figures were involved in early democratisation processes to ensure that their own advantages from the previous status quo were retained.[64] Centre-right liberalism declined with the beginning of the 20th century, and many liberal parties merged with conservative parties.[13]

United States[edit]

In the United States the Federalist Party was dominated by staunch conservatives led by Alexander Hamilton. The Federalists denounced the French Revolution.[65] However there was a more moderate faction led by President John Adams during the 1798 Quasi-War against France. The Adams coalition secured peace with France, and also installed John Marshall, who led the Supreme Court for three decades. Historian Sarah Kreps in 2018 argues the Adams faction corresponds to "today's right-of-center party."[66]

In the 1830s the Whig Party emerged with a strong base in business, the professions and commercial farming, to lead the center-right. The center-left was led by the Jeffersonians and the Jacksonians in the Democratic Party. In the turmoil of the 1850s a new party emerged to lead the center-right to victory, the Republican Party.[67]

In the early 20th century Republicans split between the left-wing under Theodore Roosevelt and the center-right under William Howard Taft; Taft defeated Roosevelt for control of the party in 1912. According to David Hackett Fischer, as president (1909-1913) and chief justice of the Supreme Court (1921-1930) Taft's political position:[68]

was conservative and very old-fashioned in its idea of protecting property, preserving personal liberty, upholding the Constitution, and supporting the existing structure of American society. At the same time it was also progressive in its idea of a small but highly efficient government that intervened actively for the general good....Altogether, William Howard Taft's progressive conservatism combined new instruments of modern government with old ideas of liberty of contract, property rights, personal liberty, and commercial freedom.

Interwar period[edit]

After World War I, several European nations formed weak centre-right parties,[69] which grew through a consolidation of the middle-class at the expense of socialist parties.[70] These centre-right parties gained influence during the Depression of 1920–1921, where they responded with measures such as a restoration of the gold standard.[71] Among the strongest of these parties were National Bloc and its successors in France, the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, and a coalition of the Catholic Conservative Party and the Radicals in Switzerland.[72] Christian democracy found a place among the European centre-right during the interwar period.[73] Centre-right parties became the primary supporters of liberal democracy at this time, challenging the historical association of liberalism with the labour movement. The liberal centre-right opposed the other two European ideologies that were growing in popularity: fascism and social democracy.[74]

The European centre-right declined between 1931 and 1935 as the Great Depression set in.[75] In nations where the centre-right lacked a unified party, such as Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, far-right movements seized power.[69] Strong pre-existing centre-right parties retained power in other countries, including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.[76] The use of market economics to keep wages steady, as well as the relative weakness of labour unions, meant that centre-right liberalism went unchallenged in much of Europe.[77]

Post–World War II[edit]

In Europe after World War II, centre-right Christian democratic parties arose as powerful political movements while the Catholic traditionalist movements in Europe diminished in strength.[78] Christian democratic movements became major movements in Austria, the Benelux countries, Germany and Italy.[78]

Neoliberalism arose as an economic theory by Milton Friedman that condemned government interventionism in the economy that it associated with socialism and collectivism.[79] Neoliberals rejected Keynesian economics that they claimed advocate too much emphasis on relieving unemployment in response to their observance of the Great Depression, identifying the real problem as being with inflation and advocate the policy of monetarism to deal with inflation.[80]

Neoliberal economics was endorsed by Conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who adapted it as part of a free-market conservatism closer to the developments in American conservatism, while traditionalist conservatism became less influential within the British Conservative Party.[81] However, the British Conservative Party still has a large traditional conservative base, particularly the conservative Cornerstone Group. Thatcher publicly supported centre-right politics and supported its spread in Eastern Europe after the end of the Marxist-Leninist regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[82] After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, a variety of centre-right political parties have emerged there, including many that support neoliberalism.[83][84]

In the United States, President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) adopted many policies stemming from Milton Friedman's economic theories, including principles from the Chicago school of economics and monetarism.[85] While social conservatives and the rise of the Christian Right contributed greatly to forming the Reagan Coalition, the President also had the support of centre-right economic neoliberals. Using Friedman's neoliberal theories, the Reagan administration cut the marginal income tax from 70% to 28%[citation needed] and slowed government spending growth from 10% in 1982 to 1% in 1987, thereby reducing inflation from 13.5% to 4.1% and civilian unemployment from 7.6% to 5.5% of the workforce throughout his tenure.[86]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Rohrschneider, Robert (May 2000). "The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies. Han-Georg Betz , Stefan Immerfall". The Journal of Politics. 62 (2): 619–620. doi:10.1086/jop.62.2.2647710. ISSN 0022-3816.
  2. ^ Kahan, Alan S. (2010), "The unexpected honeymoon of mind and money, 1730–1830", in Kahan, Alan S. (ed.), Mind vs. money: the war between intellectuals and capitalism, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, p. 88, ISBN 978-1412810630.
  3. ^ Shenon, Philip; Greenhouse, Linda (17 August 1988). "Washington talk: Briefing; the King and the Joker". The New York Times. This is the title of nobility clause, which provides: 'No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States'.(subscription required)
  4. ^ Wood, Diane (October 2005). "Our 18th century constitution in the 21st century world". New York University Law Review, Madison Lecture. 80 (4). New York University School of Law: 1079–1107. Archived from the original on 20 October 2017. Retrieved 12 October 2015. Debate [over the Constitution's] meaning is inevitable whenever something as specific as the... Titles of Nobility Clause is not at issue pp. 105. Pdf. Archived 20 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine
  5. ^ Adams, Ian (2001). Political ideology today (2nd ed.). Manchester New York: Manchester University Press. p. 57. ISBN 978-0719060205.
  6. ^ International Democrat Union. (History. Archived 1 July 2012 at the Wayback Machine Founders. Archived 1 July 2012 at the Wayback Machine Declaration of Principles. Archived 1 July 2012 at the Wayback Machine) Accessed on 22 June 2012.
  7. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019.
  8. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 18, 24.
  9. ^ a b c d e Taflaga 2023, p. 137.
  10. ^ a b Hellwig, Kweon & Vowles 2020, p. 162.
  11. ^ a b Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 18.
  12. ^ a b c Ostrowski 2023, p. 6.
  13. ^ a b c d e f g h Taflaga 2023, p. 138.
  14. ^ a b Noël & Thérien 2008, p. 233.
  15. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 21.
  16. ^ Hellwig, Kweon & Vowles 2020, p. 161.
  17. ^ Taflaga 2023, p. 143.
  18. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 24, 26.
  19. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 21–22.
  20. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 26, 28.
  21. ^ Hirschberger & Voges 2024, p. 15.
  22. ^ a b Sandal & Loizides 2013, p. 419 note 1.
  23. ^ Bale 2008, p. 324.
  24. ^ Arndt 2017, p. 496.
  25. ^ a b Botsiou 2010, p. 177.
  26. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 24–25.
  27. ^ Botsiou 2010, pp. 178, 182.
  28. ^ Hatzivassiliou 2010, pp. 210–211.
  29. ^ a b c d Taflaga 2023, p. 139.
  30. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 20.
  31. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 24.
  32. ^ Taflaga 2023, pp. 138–139.
  33. ^ Salih 2006, p. 153.
  34. ^ Botsiou 2010, p. 174.
  35. ^ Taflaga 2023, p. 140.
  36. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 29.
  37. ^ Taflaga 2023, pp. 137–138, 141.
  38. ^ a b c d Bale 2008, p. 319.
  39. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 26.
  40. ^ a b c Cliffe 2023.
  41. ^ Botsiou 2010, p. 181.
  42. ^ Taflaga 2023, p. 142.
  43. ^ a b Hatzivassiliou 2010, p. 212.
  44. ^ Arndt 2017, p. 498.
  45. ^ Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 25.
  46. ^ Woshinsky 2007, p. 113.
  47. ^ a b c Taflaga 2023, p. 141.
  48. ^ a b c d Pardos-Prado 2015, p. 354.
  49. ^ a b Luna & Kaltwasser 2014, p. 5.
  50. ^ Hellwig, Kweon & Vowles 2020, pp. 161–162.
  51. ^ Hellwig, Kweon & Vowles 2020, p. 179.
  52. ^ Freudenstein 2010, p. 245.
  53. ^ Sandal & Loizides 2013, p. 401.
  54. ^ Vaida 2017, pp. 8–9.
  55. ^ Botsiou 2010, p. 173.
  56. ^ a b c Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 27.
  57. ^ Hirschberger & Voges 2024, p. 178.
  58. ^ Hirschberger & Voges 2024, p. 179.
  59. ^ Magni & Reynolds 2023, p. 51.
  60. ^ Magni & Reynolds 2023, pp. 50–51.
  61. ^ Magni & Reynolds 2023, pp. 51–53.
  62. ^ Magni & Reynolds 2023, p. 50.
  63. ^ Woshinsky 2007, p. 109.
  64. ^ a b Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 25–26.
  65. ^ David Hackett Fischer, "The revolution of American conservatism: The Federalist Party in the era of Jeffersonian democracy." (1965).
  66. ^ Sarah Kreps, Taxing Wars: The American Way of War Finance and the Decline of Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2018) p. 53 and chapter 3.
  67. ^ Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (2005) pp. 505, 632, 644. [ https://archive.org/details/riseofamericande0000wile_f7q6 online].
  68. ^ David Hackett Fischer, Liberty and Freedom: A Visual History of America's Founding Ideas (Oxford UP, 2004) pp. 411-412.
  69. ^ a b Ziblatt 2017, p. 339.
  70. ^ Luebbert 1991, p. 8.
  71. ^ Ziblatt 2017, pp. 288–289.
  72. ^ Luebbert 1991, p. 228.
  73. ^ Hatzivassiliou 2010, p. 210.
  74. ^ Luebbert 1991, p. 2.
  75. ^ Ziblatt 2017, pp. 170.
  76. ^ Ziblatt 2017, p. 358.
  77. ^ Luebbert 1991, p. 233.
  78. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference IanAdams_a was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  79. ^ Adams, Ian (2001). Political ideology today (2nd ed.). Manchester New York: Manchester University Press. p. 206. ISBN 9780719060205.
  80. ^ Adams, Ian (2001). Political ideology today (2nd ed.). Manchester New York: Manchester University Press. p. 207. ISBN 9780719060205.
  81. ^ Adams, Ian (2001). Political ideology today (2nd ed.). Manchester New York: Manchester University Press. p. 58. ISBN 9780719060205.
  82. ^ Evans, Eric J. (1997), "Thatcher abroad III: the bringer of freedom? Principle, pragmatism and the limits of power", in Evans, Eric J. (ed.), Thatcher and Thatcherism, London New York: Routledge, p. 107, ISBN 9780203178980, Thatcher praised the winning party of the Hungarian election of 1990 as what she called a "really genuine centre-right government".
  83. ^ Hanley, Seán (2006), "Blue velvet: the rise and decline of the new Czech Right", in Szczerbiak, Aleks; Hanley, Seán (eds.), Centre-right parties in post-communist East-Central Europe, London New York: Routledge, p. 37, ISBN 9780415347815.
  84. ^ Smith, John (4 March 2015). "Labour's lackluster tuition fee pledge is the tip of the iceberg: mainstream politics is melting away". openDemocracy.
  85. ^ Cornwell, Rupert (17 November 2006). "Milton Friedman, free-market economist who inspired Reagan and Thatcher, dies aged 94". The Independent. Washington: Independent Print Ltd.
  86. ^ "The second American revolution: Reagonomics". reaganfoundation.org. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

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