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This page is about the South African invasion of Angola. For the 1941 Free French and Royal Air Force operation in Occupied France, see Operation Savanna.

Operation Savannah
Part of the Angolan Civil War
and the South African Border War

Plotted advance of the South African armoured columns during Operation Savannah. MPLA garrisons along the route axis are marked.[4]
Date14 July 1975[5] – 27 March 1976[6]
(8 months, 1 week and 6 days)
Location
Angola
Result

Strategic MPLA victory

Belligerents

 South Africa
 Zaire
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)

Military advisors:

People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
 Cuba
State of Katanga Katangese militia[3]

Supported by:[2]
 Soviet Union
 East Germany
 Algeria
 Guinea
Commanders and leaders
South Africa HJ van den Bergh[11]
South Africa Koos van Heerden[12]
South Africa Gert van Niekerk[5]
South Africa Jan Breytenbach[13]
South Africa Eddie Webb[14]
South Africa Ben Roos[15]
Holden Roberto
Jonas Savimbi
United States John Stockwell[2]		 Agostinho Neto
Iko Carreira
Cuba Abelardo Ibarra[16]
Cuba Raúl Argüelles †[16]
Cuba Ramón Espinosa Martín[17]
Strength
South Africa:
250 combat troops[18]
(later up to 3,000)[19]
2,000 support personnel[18]
22 armoured cars[20]
4 G2 howitzers[21]
3 bomber aircraft[22]
Zaire:
1,000 special forces[23][24]
2 M46 field guns[22]
FNLA:
~15,020 militants[25]
9 armoured cars[25][13]
2 personnel carriers[26]
UNITA:
4,000 militants[25]
4 armoured cars[27][28]		 MPLA (FAPLA):
20,000 militants[25]
70 armoured cars[29]
138 personnel carriers[30]
148 tanks[30]
6 BM-21 Grad[31]
25 combat aircraft[30]
Cuba:
232 advisory personnel[32]
1,879 combat troops[31]
(later up to 36,000)[33]
300 tanks[33]
Katangese militia:
6,000 militants[34]
Casualties and losses

Total: over 1,000 dead and missing

Details

Total: several hundred dead

Details
All Angolan dead (including civilians):
20,000[51]
Part of a series on the
History of Angola
Precolonial history to 1575
Colonization 1575–1641
Dutch occupation 1641–1648
Colonial history 1648–1951
Portuguese province 1951–1961
War of Independence 1961–1974
Sovereign socialist state 1975–1992
Civil War 1975–2002
Post-war Angola’s
See also
Years in Angola

Operation Savannah (Afrikaans: Operasie Savannah) was a covert invasion carried out by operatives of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in Angola between July 1975 and March 1976. A few months earlier, Angola had gained independence from Portugal following the Carnation Revolution and the subsequent collapse of the Portuguese Empire.[52] When it became clear that elections were not forthcoming and the Soviet-backed People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) intended to rule by force of arms, the country degenerated into civil war.[11] South Africa possessed a common frontier with Angola through South-West Africa, and held considerable economic interest there, including the Calueque hydroelectric dam project near Ruacana Falls.[53] The chaos caused by thousands of Angolan refugees and concern over Soviet and Cuban military assistance to the MPLA led the SADF to undertake direct intervention on behalf of the pro-Western National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).[34] Operation Savannah commenced in late 1975 with tacit approval from the United States, Zaire, and several African governments.[7] Four South African combat groups were deployed before Savannah came under heavy international pressure.[7] Cuba responded with nearly 40,000 troops and enough sophisticated weaponry to turn the tide in favour of the MPLA, allowing it to seize Luanda and establish itself as the government of Angola.[33] The Central Intelligence Agency, which had provided clandestine aid, also retracted its support.[54] These developments and a final decision by the Organization of African Unity to recognise the MPLA convinced the SADF it had no alternative but to withdraw.[7] Operation Savannah was abandoned in early 1976.[55]

The strategic failure of Operation Savannah won Cuba a degree of international prestige. The Cuban regime was credited with rescuing another socialist government from certain annihilation and humiliating South Africa, a regional pariah, in the process.[56] Its own unilateral intervention - unlike that of the SADF - escaped criticism from the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.[29] Savannah also damaged relations between South Africa's defence establishment and the United States.[57] By December 1975, US Congressional investigations into CIA activities abroad were reaching a climax, and the agency disclosed before a Senate committee it was funneling arms to Angola.[58] The Senate responded with the Clark Amendment, which curtailed the CIA's involvement.[59] Despite what reassurances South Africa felt it had received from American intelligence for continued cooperation, the US government rejected its bid for overt support.[9] Three months later, Gerald Ford's administration failed to block Savannah's censure in the United Nations Security Council.[9]

Background[edit]

Main articles: Angolan War of Independence and Alvor Agreement

Portugal fought a long and bitter counter-insurgency conflict within its African colonies from the early 1960s to 1974, the date on which Angola began to achieve full independence from Lisbon.[60] In the thirteen years following the Baixa de Cassanje revolt, three major nationalist movements emerged from the fighting between the Portuguese Army and local forces supported to varying degrees by the communist bloc.[61]

The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) recruited from Bakongo refugees in Zaire.[62] Benefiting from particularly favourable political circumstances in Léopoldville, and especially from a common border with Zaire, Angolan political exiles were able to build up a power base among a large expatriate demographic from related families, clans, and tradition. People on both sides of the border spoke mutually intelligible dialects and enjoyed shared ties to the historical Kingdom of Kongo.[63] Though as foreigners skilled Angolans could not take advantage of Mobutu Sese Seko's state employment programme, some found work as middlemen for the absentee owners of various lucrative private ventures. The migrants eventually formed the FNLA with the intention of making a bid for political power upon their envisaged return to Angola.[63]

A largely Ovimbundu guerrilla initiative against the Portuguese in southern Angola from 1964 was spearheaded by Jonas Savimbi and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).[62] It remained handicapped by its geographic remoteness from friendly borders, by the ethnic fragmentation of the highland tribes, and the isolation of peasants on European plantations where they had little opportunity to mobilise.[63]

Against the background of these simultaneous efforts, the rising of the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the east and Dembos hills north of Luanda came to hold special significance. Formed as a coalition resistance by the Angolan Communist Party,[64] the organisation's leadership remained predominantly Ambundu and courted public sector workers in Luanda.[62] Although both the MPLA and its rivals had accepted material assistance from the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China, the former harboured strong anti-imperialist views and was openly critical of the United States and its support for Portugal.[61] This allowed it to win important ground on the diplomatic front, soliciting support from nonaligned governments in Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and the United Arab Republic.[65][note 1]

The MPLA attempted to move its headquarters from Conakry to Léopoldville in October 1961, renewing efforts to create a common front with the FNLA, then known as the Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA) and its leader Holden Roberto. Roberto turned down the offer.[65] When the MPLA first attempted to insert its own insurgents into Angola, the cadres were ambushed and annihilated by UPA partisans on Roberto's orders—setting a precedent for the bitter factional strife which would later ignite the Angolan Civil War.[66]

South Africa and Angola prior to 1974[edit]

South Africa's involvement in Angola dates back to World War I, when the Union Defence Force occupied German South-West Africa (Namibia) under a League of Nations mandate.[67] As German resistance crumbled, an attempted Portuguese expansion into Oukwanyama met with opposition from Ovambo King Mandume Ya Ndemufayo.[68] To prevent his kingdom from being annexed to the Angolan colony Mandume reluctantly negotiated South African protection. A new frontier was demarcated in favour of South-West Africa, splitting the disputed land.[68] This 1,400 kilometre border fostered renewed cooperation between the two colonial administrations, which remained inextricably linked by shared economic and security interests.[67] In 1945, Marcelo Caetano, then Minister of Colonies for Portugal, received South African premier Jan Smuts at a banquet in Lourenco Marques and spoke at length of "the many common problems which concern us in the great drama of adapting Europeans to African soil".[69]

Unlike France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Spain Portugal displayed no interest in accommodating anti-colonial movements, eventually sparking the Angolan War of Independence.[70] Such pressure made Lisbon more disposed to greater correspondence with other white regimes in Africa subject to similar international difficulties.[70] Multiple affirmations of friendship between South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia culminated in the Alcora Exercise of 1970, which saw joint military consultations at the highest level.[71] With most African markets closed to South African trade, export businesses also saw the alliance as an opportunity to cosset new economic partners in Angola and Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique).[70] Following discussions with Pretoria, the Portuguese decided in 1966 to launch the Calueque hydroelectric dam on the Cunene River, which would be part of an irrigation scheme for South-West Africa.[72] South Africa's superior industrial and economic status allowed it to invest in the project while guaranteeing an essential market for Calueque's output.[73] The dam was also expected to strengthen the South-West African economy by providing cheap power from a dependable source in a stable territory.[74] More significantly, however, it also granted South Africa a vital economic stake in Angola, and would ultimately provide the pretext for the invasion of late 1975.[75]

South African and Portuguese military officers at Odibo, 1929.

After 1963 the South African Defence Force (SADF) involved itself closely in the military affairs of Angola. By this point, South Africa's continued occupation of South-West Africa in defiance of the United Nations was drawing fierce international criticism, and in August 1966 the separatist South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) launched a guerrilla insurgency.[76] With SWAPO operating on both sides of the Angolan border, the SADF and the Portuguese security service (PIDE) intensified collaboration.[77] In addition to exchanges of visits with Portuguese military and police personnel, the South African Police was also authorised to undertake punitive campaigns in Angola; a likely pretext being that South-West Africans affiliated with SWAPO's People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) were operating with Angolan partisans.[77] In May 1968, the SADF established a communications centre in Rundu to better coordinate aerial operations on behalf of the police as well as Portuguese ground forces. Additional SADF liaisons were stationed at joint headquarters near Cuito Cuanavale and Menongue.[77]

In keeping with its own anti-guerrilla strategy, the SADF recognised the need to develop a regional cordon sanitaire that included not only support for the defence establishment in Angola, but also closer links with the security forces in Rhodesia and Mozambique.[78] The aim of these policies was to develop a cooperative relationship with potential buffer states that would facilitate the process of resisting, or arresting the decolonisation process then gathering momentum elsewhere in Africa.[79] Notwithstanding the collapse of Portuguese rule, the SADF was aware that PLAN and other potential South African guerrilla movements could be provided with a new outlet for training, material support, and territorial sanctuary under the cover of escalating conflict in Angola.[80]

The Lisbon coup d'etat[edit]

Despite being fought in a relatively dispersed and desultory manner, the collective wars in Africa were consuming over 40% of Portugal's national budget by 1974 - an unsustainable burden for Western Europe's poorest nation.[60] Moreover, the Portuguese military had been demoralised by a string of bloody campaigns which left some 12,000 dead and 40,000 wounded.[60] It was fielding 150,000 troops in three war zones, proportionally five times the American commitment to South Vietnam.[81] Civilian dissent to the wars had been smouldering since the late 1960s—one result being that over half the European conscripts failed to report for duty.[81] In 1971 the South African consul in Luanda, an EM Malone, warned his superiors that the demise of Portugal's overseas empire in the face of nationalist aggression was inevitable: an event that might herald the collapse of white minority rule on the African continent as a whole.[82] Malone argued that the Portuguese were overextended, their metropolitan troops unenthusiastic, and Angolan auxiliaries ineffective.[83]

The marked deterioration of Angola's tactical circumstances paralleled a domestic asymmetry which eroded Lisbon's will to retain her empire. In early 1974 two leading Portuguese generals, António de Spínola and Francisco da Costa Gomes, called for a political solution to the colonial conflict. Both were quickly dismissed, but the book Spínola published on the topic became a national sensation. On 25 April 1974 junior military officers across the country seized power during a unexpected coup d'etat. In place of the ousted authoritarian regime they installed a Junta of National Salvation under the leadership of the same men whose outspoken criticism of the African war effort had led to their removal the previous month.


These abrupt developments ushered in a new period of escalating violence and political turmoil throughout the Portuguese territories. Spínola's anticipated decision to disengage from Africa after fifteen years of conflict created a power vacuum which other nations were keen to exploit. By November, over thirty foreign powers would be involved in Angola, supplying military equipment, instructors, or financial assistance to the three rival political factions as they jockeyed for power.

The collapse of the Portuguese Empire permanently altered the political landscape in Southern Africa, invalidating the regional policy of the US. In 1970, the National Security Council had identified the area as nonessential to American strategic interests and expressed no confidence in the ability of local guerrillas to oust Portugal. This encouraged Washington to strengthen its ties to Lisbon while refocusing on Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union was more alarmed by Chinese support for UNITA and the FNLA, as well as the arrival of 100 Chinese military advisers in Angola, which threatened to put the MPLA at a tactical disadvantage and give Beijing important influence in a region Moscow was already cultivating into its sphere.

Of all the parties affected by Angolan independence, South Africa viewed the altered political landscape as an unparalleled catastrophe. Its implications on South African policymaking were certainly the most seismic; the unpopular Afrikaner government now faced the likelihood of another neighbouring state opposed to its controversial racial system, while providing the Soviet regime with an excellent pretext for involving itself both politically and militarily in the region. Events in Angola also elicited a striking response from black South Africans, who concluded that if liberation movements could win self-determination elsewhere, it could also be their own case in the future. An increasing number of radicals believed that by intensifying their own armed struggle, they could force the government, under similar circumstances, to sue for peace and agree to majority rule. In September 1974 for example, the South African Students' Organisation held an illegal rally in solidarity with Mozambique's new FRELIMO rulers. Mozambican independence in June 1975 was also widely celebrated in South Africa.

The so-called "Carnation Revolution" of 25 April 1974 ended Portugal's colonial government, but Angola's three main liberation forces, National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) began competing for dominance in the country. Fighting began in November 1974, starting in the capital city, Luanda, and spreading quickly across all of Angola, which was soon divided among the combatants. The FNLA occupied northern Angola and UNITA the central south, while The MPLA mostly occupied the coastline, the far south-east and, after capturing it in November 1974, Cabinda. Negotiations for independence resulted in the Treaty of Alvor being signed on 15 January 1975, naming the date of official independence as 11 November 1975. The agreement ended the war for independence but marked the escalation of the civil war. Two dissenting groups, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda and the Eastern Revolt, never signed the accords, as they were excluded from negotiations. The coalition government established by the Treaty of Alvor soon ended as nationalist factions, doubting one another's intentions, tried to control the country by force. [84][85] Fighting between the three forces resumed in Luanda hardly a day after the transitional government assumed office on 15 January 1975.[86][87][88][89]

The liberation forces sought to seize strategic points, most importantly the capital, by the official day of independence. The MPLA managed to seize Luanda from the FLNA whilst UNITA retreated from the capital. By March 1975, the FNLA was driving towards Luanda from the north, joined by units of the Zairian army which the United States had encouraged Zaire to provide.[90] Between 28 April and early May, 1,200 Zairian troops crossed into northern Angola to assist the FNLA. [91] [92] The FNLA eliminated all remaining MPLA presence in the northern provinces and assumed positions east of Kifangondo on the eastern outskirts of Luanda, from where it continued to encroach on the capital.[93][94] The situation for the MPLA in Luanda became increasingly precarious.[89]

The MPLA received supplies from the Soviet Union and repeatedly requested 100 officers for military training from Cuba. Until late August, Cuba had a few technical advisors deployed in Angola.[95] By 9 July, the MPLA gained control of the capital, Luanda.

Starting 21 August, Cuba established four training facilities (CIR) with almost 500 men, which were to train about 4,800 FAPLA recruits in three to six months.[96][97] The mission was expected to be short-term and to last about 6 months.[98] The CIR in Cabinda accounted for 191 instructors, while Benguela, Saurimo (formerly Henrique de Carvalho) and at N'Dalatando (formerly Salazar) had 66 or 67 instructors each. Some were posted in headquarters in Luanda or in other places throughout the country. The training centres were operational by 18–20 October.[99]

Military intervention[edit]

South African Eland armoured cars in a forward staging area just prior to Operation Savannah.

South African Defence Force (SADF) involvement in Angola, part of the interrelated South African Border War and Namibian War of Independence, started in 1966 when the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) commenced an armed struggle for Namibian independence. SWAPO officials founded an armed wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), which operated from bases in Zambia and rural Ovamboland.[89][100]

With the loss of the Portuguese colonial administration as an ally and the possibility of new regimes sympathetic to SWAPO in Lisbon's former colonies, Pretoria recognised that it would lose a valued cordon sanitaire between South West Africa and the Frontline States.[100][101][102][103] PLAN could seek sanctuary in Angola, and South Africa would be faced with another hostile regime and potentially militarised border to cross in pursuit of Namibian guerrillas.

With both the Soviet Union and the United States arming major factions in the Angolan Civil War, the conflict escalated into a major Cold War battleground. South Africa offered advisory and technical assistance to UNITA, while a number of Cuban combat troops entered the country to fight alongside the Marxist MPLA. Moscow also plied its Angolan clients with heavy weapons. American aid to UNITA and the FNLA was initially undertaken with Operation IA Feature, but this was terminated by the Clark Amendment in October 1976. Aid would not yet return until after the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985.[104] China subsequently recalled its military advisers from Zaire, ending its tacit support for the FNLA.[105]

Cuban instructors began training PLAN in Zambia in April 1975, and the movement had 3,000 new recruits by April. Guerrilla activity intensified, election boycotts were staged in Ovamboland, and the Ovambo Chief Minister assassinated. South Africa responded by calling up more reservists and placing existing security forces along the border on standby. Raids into Angola became commonplace after July 15.[106]

Support for UNITA and FNLA[edit]

Consequently, with the covert assistance of the United States through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), it began assisting UNITA and the FNLA in a bid to ensure that a neutral or friendly government in Luanda prevailed.[89] On 14 July 1975, South African Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster approved weapons worth US $14 million to be bought secretly for FNLA and UNITA.[107][108] of which the first shipments from South Africa arrived in August 1975.

Ruacana-Calueque occupation[edit]

On 9 August 1975 a 30-man SADF patrol moved some 50 kilometres (31 mi) into southern Angola and occupied the Ruacana-Calueque hydro-electric complex and other installations on the Cunene River.[89][109]: 39  The scheme was an important strategic asset for Ovamboland, which relied on it for its water supply. The facility had been completed earlier in the year with South African funding.[110] Several hostile incidences with UNITA and SWAPO frightening foreign workers had provided a rationale for the occupation.[111] The defence of the facility in southern Angola also was South Africa's justification for the first permanent deployment of regular SADF units inside Angola.[112][113] On 22 August 1975 the SADF initiated operation "Sausage II", a major raid against SWAPO in southern Angola and on 4 September 1975, Vorster authorized the provision of limited military training, advice and logistical assistance. In turn FNLA and UNITA would help the South Africans fight SWAPO.[100][114]

Meanwhile, the MPLA had gained against UNITA in Southern Angola and by mid-October was in control of 12 of Angola's provinces and most cities. UNITA's territory had been shrinking to parts of central Angola,[115] and it became apparent that UNITA did not have any chance of capturing Luanda by independence day, which neither the United States nor South Africa were willing to accept.[116]

The SADF established a training camp near Silva Porto (Kuito) and prepared the defences of Nova Lisboa (Huambo). They assembled the mobile attack unit "Foxbat" to stop approaching FAPLA-units with which it clashed on 5 October, thus saving Nova Lisboa for UNITA.[89][117]

Task Force Zulu[edit]

On 14 October, the South Africans secretly initiated Operation Savannah when Task Force Zulu, the first of several South African columns, crossed from Namibia into Cuando Cubango. The operation provided for elimination of the MPLA from the southern border area, then from south western Angola, from the central region, and finally for the capture of Luanda.[118] According to John Stockwell, a former CIA officer, "there was close liaison between the CIA and the South Africans" [116] and "’high officials’ in Pretoria claimed that their intervention in Angola had been based on an ‘understanding’ with the United States".[119] The intervention was also backed by Zaire and Zambia.[120]

With the liberation forces busy fighting each other, the SADF advanced very quickly. Task Force Foxbat joined the invasion in mid-October.[100][121][122] The territory the MPLA had just gained in the south was quickly lost to the South African advances. After South African advisors and antitank weapons helped to stop an MPLA advance on Nova Lisboa (Huambo) in early October, Zulu captured Rocadas (Xangongo) by 20, Sa da Bandeira (Lubango) by 24 and Mocamedes by 28 October.

With the South Africans moving quickly toward Luanda, the Cubans had to terminate the CIR at Salazar only 3 days after it started operating and deployed most of the instructors and Angolan recruits in Luanda.[123] On 2–3 November, 51 Cubans from the CIR Benguela and South Africans had their first direct encounter near Catengue, where FAPLA unsuccessfully tried to stop the Zulu advance. This encounter led Zulu-Commander Breytenbach to conclude that his troops had faced the best organized FAPLA opposition to date.[124]

For the duration of the campaign, Zulu had advanced 3,159 km in thirty-three days and had fought twenty-one battles / skirmishes in addition to sixteen hasty and fourteen deliberate attacks. the Task Force accounted for an estimated 210 MPLA dead, 96 wounded and 50 POWs while it had suffered 5 dead and 41 wounded.[89][125]

Cuban intervention[edit]

After the MPLA debacle at Catengue, the Cubans became very aware of the South African intervention. On 4 November Castro decided to begin an intervention on an unprecedented scale: "Operation Carlota". The same day, a first airplane with 100 heavy weapon specialists, which the MPLA had requested in September, left for Brazzaville, arriving in Luanda on 7 November. On November 9 the first 100 men of a contingent of a 652-strong battalion of elite Special Forces were flown in.[126] The 100 specialists and 88 men of the special forces were dispatched immediately to the nearby front at Kifangondo. They assisted 850 FAPLA, 200 Katangans and one Soviet advisor.

With the help of the Cubans and the Soviet advisor, FAPLA decisively repelled an FNLA-Zairian assault in the Battle of Kifangondo on 8 November.[127] The South African contingent, 52 men commanded by General Ben de Wet Roos, that had provided for the artillery on the northern front, had to be evacuated by ship on 28 November.[128] MPLA-leader Agostinho Neto proclaimed independence and the formation of the People's Republic of Angola on 11 November and became its first President.

South African reinforcements[edit]

On 6 and 7 November 1975 Zulu captured the harbour cities of Benguela (terminal of the Benguela railroad) and Lobito. The towns and cities captured by the SADF were given to UNITA. In central Angola, at the same time, combat unit Foxbat had moved 800 kilometres (500 mi) north toward Luanda.[112] By then, the South Africans realised that Luanda could not be captured by independence day on 11 November and the South Africans considered ending the advance and retreating. But on 10 November 1975 Vorster relented to UNITA's urgent request to maintain the military pressure with the objective of capturing as much territory as possible before the impending meeting of the Organization of African Unity.[129] Thus, Zulu and Foxbat continued north with two new battle groups formed further inland (X-Ray and Orange) and "there was little reason to think the FAPLA would be able to stop this expanded force from capturing Luanda within a week." [130] Through November and December 1975, the SADF presence in Angola numbered 2,900 to 3,000 personnel.[89][131]

After Luanda was secured against the north and with reinforcements from Cuba arriving, Zulu faced stronger resistance advancing on Novo Redondo (Sumbe). First Cuban reinforcements arrived in Porto Amboim, only a few km north of Novo Redondo, quickly destroying three bridges crossing the Queve river, effectively stopping the South African advance along the coast on 13 November 1975.[132] Despite concerted efforts to advance north to Novo Redondo, the SADF was unable to break through FAPLA defences.[133][134][135] In a last successful advance a South African task force and UNITA troops captured Luso on the Benguela railway on 11 December which they held until 27 December.[89][136]

End of South African advance[edit]

By mid-December South Africa extended military service and brought in reserves.[137][138] "An indication of the seriousness of the situation ... is that one of the most extensive military call-ups in South African history is now taking place".[139] By late December, the Cubans had deployed 3,500 to 4,000 troops in Angola, of which 1,000 were securing Cabinda,[140] and eventually the struggle began to favour of the MPLA.[141] Apart from being "bogged down" on the southern front,[142] the South African advance halted, “as all attempts by Battle-Groups Orange and X-Ray to extend the war into the interior had been forced to turn back by destroyed bridges”.[143] In addition, South Africa had to deal with two other major setbacks: the international press criticism of the operation and the associated change of US policies. Following the discovery of SADF troops in Angola, most African and Western backers declined to continue to back the South Africans due to the negative publicity of links with the Apartheid government.[144] The South African leadership felt betrayed with a member of congress saying “When the chips were down there was not a single state prepared to stand with South Africa. Where was America? Where were Zaire, Zambia ... and South Africa's other friends?"[145]

Major battles and incidents[edit]

Battle of Quifangondo[edit]

Main article: Battle of Quifangondo

On 10 November 1975, the day before Angolan independence, the FNLA attempted against advice to capture Luanda from the MPLA. South African gunners and aircraft assisted the offensive which went horribly wrong for the attackers; they were routed by the FAPLA assisted by Cubans manning superior weaponry that had arrived recently in the country. The South African artillery, antiquated due to the UN embargo, was not any match for the longer-ranged Cuban BM-21 rocket launchers, and therefore could not influence the result of the battle.

Battle of Ebo[edit]

The Cuban military, anticipating a South African advance (under the direction of Lieutenant Christopher du Raan) towards the town of Ebo, established positions there at a river crossing to thwart any assault. The defending artillery force, equipped with a BM-21 battery, a 76mm field gun, and several anti-tank units, subsequently destroyed five to six armoured cars, whilst they were bogged down with RPG-7s, on November 25, killing 5 and wounding 11 South African soldiers.[citation needed] A Cessna spotter aircraft was shot down over Ebo the following day. This was the first tangible South African defeat of Operation Savannah.

"Bridge 14"[edit]

Following the ambush at Ebo, the South African Battle Group Foxbat began attempting to breach the Nhia River at "Bridge 14", a strategic crossing near the FAPLA headquarters north of Quibala. This ensuing Battle for Bridge 14 accounted for the many fierce actions fought by withdrawing Cuban and Angolan forces from the river inland to "Top Hat", a hill overlooking the southern approach to the bridge.[89][109]: 54 [146] In early December, Foxbat had infiltrated the hill with two artillery observers, who directed fire on FAPLA positions from a battery of BL 5.5-inch Medium Guns.[147] This development forced Cuban commander Raúl Arguelles to call off an intended counter-offensive and order a redeployment via Ebo, instructing his units to withdraw from the Nhia. Unfortunately, his subsequent death in a landmine explosion caused much confusion in some sectors of the defence line, with several of the defending units overlooking Bridge 14 as a result of a series of miscommunications. Meanwhile, South African sappers started repairing the bridge on December 11 despite heavy FAPLA opposition. By morning the situation had worsened with Foxbat advancing in full force.[148] At about 7 AM, the defending troops came under attack. Heavy artillery pounded the northern banks, wiping out several mortar positions and at least one ammunition truck. The Cubans, supported by ZPU-4s and BM-21 Grads, covered the main road with Sagger wire-guided missiles to deter the South African advance. However, a column of twelve Eland-90 armoured cars supported by infantry broke through, skirting the road to confuse the missile teams, who had trained their weapons on the centre of the bridge.[149]

The Elands swiftly engaged the remaining mortars with high-explosive shells, routing their crews. Twenty Cuban advisers were also dispatched when they attempted to overtake a Lieutenant van Vuuren's armoured car in the chaos, possibly mistaking it for an Angolan vehicle. Slowing to let the truck pass, van Vuuren promptly slammed a 90mm round into its rear – killing the occupants.[149]

It was during this engagement that Danny Roxo was claimed to have single-handedly killed twelve FAPLA soldiers while conducting a reconnaissance of the bridge, an action for which he was awarded the Honoris Crux.[150] A number of other South African military personnel were also decorated for bravery at Bridge 14, some posthumously. It is estimated that several hundred Cubans lost their lives during the attack; the SADF suffered 4 dead.[89][146][148]

The events at Bridge 14 were subsequently dramatised by South Africa in the 1976 Afrikaans film Brug 14.

Battle of Luso[edit]

On December 10, the South African Task Force X-Ray followed the Benguela railway line from Silva Porto (Kuito) east to Luso, which they overran on the 10th December 1975.[151] The South African contingent included an armoured squadron, supporting infantry units, some artillery, engineers, and UNITA irregulars. Their main objective was to seize the Luso airport,[152] which later went on to serve as a supply point until the South Africans finally departed Angola in early January 1976.

Battles involving Battlegroup Zulu in the west[edit]

There were numerous unrecorded clashes fought in the southwest between Colonel Jan Breytenbach's SADF battlegroup and scattered MPLA positions during Operation Savannah. Eventually, Breytenbach's men were able to advance three thousand kilometers over Angolan soil in thirty-three days.

On a related note, Battlegroup Zulu later formed the basis of South Africa's famous 32 Battalion.

Ambrizete incident[edit]

The South African Navy was not planned to be involved in the hereunto land operation, but after a failed intervention by the South African Army in the Battle of Quifangondo, nevertheless had to hastily extract a number of army personnel by sea from far behind enemy lines in Angola, as well as abandoned guns. Ambrizete north of Luanda at 7°13′25″S 12°51′24″E / 7.22361°S 12.85667°E / -7.22361; 12.85667 (Ambizete) was chosen as the pick-up point for the gunners involved in the defeat at Quifangondo. The frigates SAS President Kruger and SAS President Steyn went to the area, where the latter used inflatable boats and its Westland Wasp helicopter to extract 26 personnel successfully from the beach on 28 November 1975.[89][153][154] The replenishment oiler SAS Tafelberg provided logistical support to the frigates, and picked up the guns in Ambriz after they were towed to Zaire, and took them to Walvis Bay.

General Constand Viljoen, who had grave concerns at the time about the safety of both his soldiers and abandoned field guns, called it "the most difficult night ever in my operational career".[155]

The success of this operation was exceptionally fortuitous, given that the South African Navy had been penetrated by the spy Dieter Gerhardt.

Aftermath[edit]

Memorial plaques in the Voortrekker Monument for four South African servicemen killed during Operation Savannah

South Africa continued to assist UNITA in order to ensure that SWAPO did not establish any bases in southern Angola.[89]

The 49 South African casualties during the conflict were never acknowledged by the SADF, who were operating covertly in the country. These soldiers were listed simply as 'missing' rather than 'killed in action', resulting in a number of Supreme Court cases afterwards to change their status.

South African order of battle[edit]

Main article: South African order of battle during Operation Savannah

The South Africans deployed a number of Combat Groups during Operation Savannah – initially, only Combat Groups A and B were deployed, with the remaining groups being mobilised and deployed into Angola later in the campaign. There has been much dispute the overall size of Task Force Zulu. Current evidence indicates that the Task Force started with approximately 500 men and grew to a total of 2,900 with the formation of Battle Groups Foxbat, Orange and X-Ray.[156]

Association[edit]

The Savannah Association is an association of ex-servicemen of all units who were involved in the operation. They meet annually to commemorate the operation. The insignia of the association is a Trefoil.

Further reading[edit]

  • François Jacobus du Toit Spies (1989). Operasie Savannah. Laserdruk. ISBN 0-621-12641-1.
  • Steenkamp, Willem (1989). South Africa's border war, 1966–1989. Gibraltar: Ashanti Pub. ISBN 0620139676.
  • http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/viewFile/1042/1032
  • Battle of Bridge 14

Notes and citations[edit]

Notes
  1. ^ Egypt appears to have sided with UNITA after the dissolution of the short-lived United Arab Republic.
Citations
  1. ^ Stockwell 1979, p. 181.
  2. ^ a b c Stockwell 1979, p. 198.
  3. ^ Stockwell 1979, p. 157.
  4. ^ George 2005, p. 95. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFGeorge2005 (help)
  5. ^ a b Steenkamp 2006, p. 27. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFSteenkamp2006 (help)
  6. ^ Warwick 2012, p. 376.
  7. ^ a b c d Scholtz 2006, p. 28.
  8. ^ Stockwell 1979, p. 244.
  9. ^ a b c Stockwell 1979, p. 245.
  10. ^ George 2005, p. 80. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFGeorge2005 (help)
  11. ^ a b Roherty 1992, p. 73.
  12. ^ Steenkamp 2006, p. 47. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFSteenkamp2006 (help)
  13. ^ a b Steenkamp 2006, p. 29. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFSteenkamp2006 (help)
  14. ^ Steenkamp 2006, p. 42. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFSteenkamp2006 (help)
  15. ^ Steenkamp 2006, p. 28. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFSteenkamp2006 (help)
  16. ^ a b George 2005, p. 65. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFGeorge2005 (help)
  17. ^ George 2005, p. 66. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFGeorge2005 (help)
  18. ^ a b Stockwell 1979, p. 169.
  19. ^ Warwick & 2012 375.
  20. ^ Hamann 2001, p. 31. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFHamann2001 (help)
  21. ^ Steenkamp 2006, p. 86. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFSteenkamp2006 (help)
  22. ^ a b Warwick 2012, p. 371.
  23. ^ Stockwell 1979, p. 168.
  24. ^ Fitzsimmons 2013, p. 152.
  25. ^ a b c d Stockwell 1979, p. 96.
  26. ^ Fitzsimmons 2013, p. 158.
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  28. ^ Hamann 2001, p. 29. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFHamann2001 (help)
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  30. ^ a b c SIPRI 2009.
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  34. ^ a b Clayton 1999, p. 119.
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  38. ^ ACIG 2003.
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  44. ^ Stockwell 1979, p. 140.
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  48. ^ George 2005, p. 112. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFGeorge2005 (help)
  49. ^ Fitzsimmons 2013, p. 159.
  50. ^ Du Preez 1989, p. 182.
  51. ^ Rummel 1997.
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  53. ^ Jaster 1985, p. 59.
  54. ^ O'Meara 1996, p. 221.
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  56. ^ George 2005, p. 113. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFGeorge2005 (help)
  57. ^ O'Meara 1996, p. 222.
  58. ^ Stockwell 1979, p. 247.
  59. ^ George 2005, p. 100. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFGeorge2005 (help)
  60. ^ a b c Cornwell 2000, p. 57.
  61. ^ a b Stockwell 1979, p. 44.
  62. ^ a b c Hanlon 1986, p. 155.
  63. ^ a b c Chabal 2002, p. 142. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFChabal2002 (help)
  64. ^ Cornwell 2000, p. 45.
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  66. ^ Cornwell 2000, p. 51.
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  68. ^ a b IDAF 1982, p. 6.
  69. ^ Minter 1972, p. 128.
  70. ^ a b c Nolutshungu 1975, p. 162.
  71. ^ Petter-Bowyer 2003, p. 162.
  72. ^ Nolutshungu 1975, p. 166.
  73. ^ Minter 1972, p. 130.
  74. ^ Nolutshungu 1975, p. 167.
  75. ^ UPI 1975.
  76. ^ Dzimba 1998, p. 8.
  77. ^ a b c Weigert 2011, p. 48.
  78. ^ Dzimba 1998, p. 4.
  79. ^ Dzimba 1998, p. 9.
  80. ^ Dzimba 1998, p. 15.
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  82. ^ Larmer 2011, p. 142.
  83. ^ Correia 2007, p. 133.
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  90. ^ Norton, W.: In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, New York, 1978, quoted in: Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 67, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  91. ^ Wright, George in: The Destruction of a Nation: United States’ Policy toward Angola since 1945, Pluto Press, London, Chicago, 1997, ISBN 0-7453-1029-X, p. 60
  92. ^ George (2005), p. 63
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  99. ^ George (2005), p. 67
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  101. ^ Stührenberg, Michael in: Die Zeit 17/1988, Die Schlacht am Ende der Welt, p. 11
  102. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 273-276
  103. ^ Dr. Leopold Scholtz: The Namibian Border War (Stellenbosch University)
  104. ^ "Trade Registers". Armstrade.sipri.org. Retrieved 11 May 2014.
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  107. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975–1976, Pretoria, p. 64-65
  108. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Deon Geldenhuys in: The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, p. 80
  109. ^ a b Steenkamp, Willem (1989). South Africa's Border War 1966 – 1989. Ashanti Publishing.
  110. ^ "Agreement between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of Portugal in regard to the first phase of development of the water resources of the Cunene river basin" (Press release). Département de l'administration et des finances (Portugal). 21 January 1969. {{cite press release}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  111. ^ Hamann, Hilton (2001). Days of the Generals. New Holland Publishers. p. 21. ISBN 978-1-86872-340-9. Retrieved 15 October 2007.
  112. ^ a b IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974–1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003
  113. ^ Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 71, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  114. ^ George (2005), p. 68
  115. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, DOS, in: Angola: The MPLA Prepares for Independence, September 22, 1975, p 4-5, National Security Archive, Washington, quoting: Le Monde, September 13, 1975, p. 3 and quoting: Diaz Arguelles to Colomé, October 1, 1975, p. 11
  116. ^ a b Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 72, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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  118. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Deon Geldenhuys in: The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, p. 80, quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975–1976, Pretoria, pp. 32, 63, 86 and quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975–1976, Pretoria, pp. 93–101
  119. ^ Marcum, John in: Lessons of Angola, Foreign Affairs 54, No. 3 (April 1976), quoted in: Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 62, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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  121. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 298
  122. ^ Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 62, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  123. ^ George (2005), pp. 73–74
  124. ^ George (2005), p. 76
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References[edit]

Online sources
Newspaper and journal articles
  • Warwick, Rodney (2012). "Operation Savannah: A Measure of SADF Decline, Resourcefulness and Modernisation". Scientia Militaria. 40 (3): 354–397.
  • Scholtz, Leopold (2006). "The Namibian Border War: An Appraisal of South African Strategy". Scientia Militaria. 34 (1): 19–48.
  • Correia, Paulo (2007). "Political relations between Portugal and South Africa from the end of the second World War until 1974" (Document). Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand. {{cite document}}: Unknown parameter |accessdate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |editor-first= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |editor-last= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |url= ignored (help)
  • UPI, uncredited (5 December 1975). "South African troops in Angola". Bangor Daily News. Bangor, Maine. Retrieved 18 February 2015.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
Bibliography
  • Stockwell, John (1979) [1978]. In search of enemies. London: Futura Publications Limited. ISBN 978-0393009262.
  • George, Edward (2005). The Cuban intervention in Angola. New York: Frank Cass Publishers. ISBN 978-0415647106.
  • Steenkamp, Willem (2006) [1985]. Borderstrike! (Third ed.). Durban: Just Done Productions Publishing. ISBN 978-1-920169-00-8.
  • Roherty, James Michael (1992). State Security in South Africa: Civil-military Relations Under P.W. Botha. New York: ME Sharpe Publishers. ISBN 978-0873328777.
  • Fitzsimmons, Scott (2013). Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1107-02691-9.
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